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An Inconvenient Lie: Big Tobacco Was Put on 
Trial for Denying the Effects of Smoking; Is 
Climate Change Denial Off-Limits? 
Elizabeth Dubats* 
ABSTRACT 
Plaintiffs have made several notable attempts to bring nuisance, trespass, and 
negligence suits against major sources of greenhouse gas emissions for climate change 
related injuries. While climate change is a widely recognized environmental issue, courts 
have refused to recognize it as a basis for a valid cause of action in tort, finding either 
petitioners lack standing to bring the claim, or that the claim raises political questions 
that should not be addressed by the judiciary. Some more recent climate change tort 
claims have also included allegations of fraud on the part of the hydrocarbon industry for 
actively perpetuating misinformation about climate change. These claims have 
interesting parallels in fraud claims brought against tobacco companies regarding the 
dangers of smoking. These commonalities are relevant to the extent that mass fraud 
claims against the tobacco industry, unlike similar claims against the petroleum industry, 
were recognized as justiciable. This raises the question of whether there is a legally 
relevant difference between the two claims of fraudulent activity that would justify 
justiciability in one instance and not the other. This Note argues there is not. Both claims 
essentially allege fraud based on the denial of the scientific cause of the harm, and both 
claims target large contributors to a scientifically complex chain of causation. To the 
extent that climate change is a more or less scientifically sound chain of causation is a 
scientific question, not a political one, and is within the competency of the courts to 
resolve. 
 
“I told you before I'm not a scientist . . . . That’s why I don't want to have 
to deal with global warming, to tell you the truth.” —Justice Antonin 
Scalia.1 
 
“Courts must decide every case that walks in the courthouse door, even 
when it presents the kind of jurisprudential, public policy, evidentiary, and 
case management problems inherent in this litigation.” —United States v. 
Philip Morris USA, Inc.2 
                                                
* Juris Doctor, 2012, Northwestern University School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Michael Barsa  
for his valuable feedback and the editors of the Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy for their  
helpful comments. 
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 23:1–5, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
2 449 F.Supp.2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Human activity has consequences. If I hit someone with my car, the laws of physics 
tell me that action will likely cause harm. If I release 6,956,800,000 metric tons of carbon 
dioxide into the Earth’s atmosphere,3 the laws of physics tell me that this matter does not 
just disappear, and there is scientific consensus that it causes harm. If I tell someone 
something I know is untrue, I run the risk that they will believe me and act upon this 
misinformation to their detriment, or the detriment of others. This Note addresses the 
intersection of science, accountability, and tort. Generally speaking, tort actions comprise 
a very small percentage of litigation based on climate change.4 However, the claims 
brought, mostly under nuisance, negligence, and trespass theories have garnered 
disproportionate attention for their audacity. Recognizing climate change as part of a 
cause of action in tort pulls this scientific phenomenon that has seemingly eluded 
legislators due to sheer complexity from Capitol Hill and places it onto the federal 
dockets.  
Broadly speaking, climate change tort forces courts to confront the limitations of 
the judicial branch. The approach thus far has been for courts to respond to this 
confrontation with dismissal of the case on political question or standing grounds.5 
However, the once radical view that these nuisance cases are no different from any other 
case with complex questions of proximate cause has gained some traction.6 While the 
common law property tort allegations raised in recent climate change cases have garnered 
a good amount of academic attention,7 very little attention has been paid to the fraud and 
                                                
3 Total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions for 2008. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2008 (Apr. 15, 2010). 
4 David Markell & J.B. Rulh, An Empirical Survey of Climate Change Litigation in the United States, 40 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10644 (2010). A breakdown of climate change litigation by the numbers 
reveals that common law tort actions comprise less than five percent of claims filed. Id.  
5 See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 406 F.Supp.2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing the 
case in part because of the court would be ill equipped to provide the injunctive relief plaintiffs sought, 
emissions caps), rev’d, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part and remanded, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). Paradoxically, 
the one case that would pose the most problems for judicial manageability and extrajudicial policy 
decisions is the one case that has so far eluded dismissal on interlocutory appeal.  
6 Susan Muller, Unprecedented Harm: Will the Roberts Court Recognize the Distinction Between Global 
Warming and Its Effects?, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317 (2010) (examining standing in the context of climate 
change litigation, focusing in the issue of harm and the question of whether or not the harm associated with 
climate change can ever be concrete and particularized enough for standing); Christopher R. Reeves, 
Climate Change on Trial: Making the Case for Causation, 32 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 495 (2009) (analyzing 
the causation issues that will arise in any climate change cause of action). The Supreme Court recently 
ruled on one such case. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). The Court was evenly 
divided on the question of standing and thus affirmed the exercise of discretion on the part of the Second 
Circuit. The Court reversed, however on the question of federal common law nuisance, maintaining it is 
preempted by EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.  
7 E.g., David Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, (Nw. U. L. Pub L. 
& Legal Theory Series Working Paper No. 08-16, L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 08-05); Muller, supra 
note 6; Reeves, supra note 6; Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, The “Gift” That Keeps on Giving: 
Global Warming Meets the Common Law, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 109 (2008); and David A. Grossman, 
Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 
(2003).  
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conspiracy allegations against major greenhouse gas emitting industries. These claims 
arise out of the massive public relations and lobbying campaigns conducted in the 1990s 
and early 2000s. These misinformation campaigns sought to impede both individual and 
political action to prevent climate change by creating doubt as to the existence of 
anthropogenic global warming, despite the overwhelming scientific evidence in support 
of action.8  
From the bench, climate change fraud looks a lot like a tobacco fraud case, and 
decades of tobacco litigation may hold some strategic insight for approaching a fraud 
case with comparably complex causal chains. Tobacco plaintiffs struggled for many years 
to obtain tort compensation for wrongful deaths and other injuries caused by smoking-
related disease.9 Mass fraud and conspiracy claims brought by states were more 
successful.10 Eventually, the United States pursued charges under the Racketeer 
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).11 The fraud allegations against major 
carbon emitting industries follow a pattern of counterscience and reliance on doubt 
similar to those made against major tobacco companies regarding their representations of 
the health risks of smoking and the addictiveness of cigarettes. 12 In fact, comparisons 
have been drawn between tobacco litigation and litigation against the petroleum industry 
with respect to other claims:13 both types of cases involve complex chains of causation 
with many potential contributing factors and both require a judge to referee a battle of 
expert witnesses and to ultimately determine where the weight of the evidence falls. The 
question that remains is why courts were ready to confront scientific complexity in the 
case of tobacco’s link to cancer and other disease, but continue to find climate change too 
daunting to confront on the merits. The difference in the treatment of climate change 
related fraud claims and other climate change tort arises largely out of a failure to place 
fraud in a causal chain linked to a particularized injury (e.g. sea level rise).14 Where the 
                                                
8 Third Am. Class Action Compl., Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007) 
(No. 1:05-cv-00436-LTS-RHW), ¶ 39; Compl. for Damages Demand for Jury Trial, Native Village of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08 1138 SBA) 2008 WL 
594713, ¶¶ 189, 190; see also JAMES HOGGAN, CLIMATE COVER-UP: THE CRUSADE TO DENY GLOBAL 
WARMING (2009). 
9 See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociological History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853 (1992).  
10 In 1998 the four largest tobacco companies settled with forty-six states. See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF 
AGRIC. POLICY, MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 1 (2005), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20080625084126/http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-
pdf/1109185724_1032468605_cigmsa.pdf. 
11 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006); Scott L. Zeger et al., Statistical Testimony on Damages in Minnesota v. 
Tobacco Industry in STATISTICS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: STATISTICAL SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM 303 (Joseph L. Gastwirth ed., 2000); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 
2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in relevant part, 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Philip Morris 
USA, Inc. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 3501 (2010).  
12 DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT (2008). 
13 Angela Lipanovich, Comment, Smoke Before Oil: Modeling a Suit Against the Auto and Oil Industry on 
the Tobacco Tort Litigation is Feasible, 35 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REV. 429 (2005) (examining tobacco 
litigation as a model for litigation addressing environmental harms caused by vehicle and power generation 
emissions respect to issues of standing, preemption, and products liability).  
14 Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer II), 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (mistakenly identifying the fraud injury 
as a lack of government action rather than tying the fraud back to the particularized injuries linked to the 
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fraud-injury connection in tobacco fraud is fairly straightforward (misrepresentation à 
consumption à injury), courts have had more difficulty with the causal chain put into 
motion by climate fraud. Further, climate skeptics have done such a good job politicizing 
the science at the heart of the issue that courts have written off the scientific question of 
climate causation as a nonjusticiable political question.15 However, ultimately climate 
change fraud claims are materially indistinguishable from the tobacco fraud lawsuits and 
therefore should not be so easily dismissed. 
Separating fact from fiction is a core judicial function, and the courts have 
developed sophisticated procedural standards in order to determine the validity of expert 
testimony.16 Too often the courts have conflated the scientific question at the heart of the 
climate change fraud allegations with a nonjusticiable political question, and in the 
process, dodged important questions of scientific integrity, corporate accountability and 
free speech that are well within their jurisdiction. Part I of this Note examines the 
successful RICO case mounted against the tobacco industry and compares the facts of 
that case to the facts alleged in current climate change fraud cases; Part II reviews the 
treatment of climate change-based tort claims in federal court; Part III discusses the 
implications of the comparison between tobacco and climate change claims for the 
viability of a climate change fraud claim; Part IV examines the benefits and weaknesses 
of addressing climate change fraud through the judicial branch. 
I. SCIENTIFIC FRAUD: THE EXAMPLE OF THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY AND THE CASE FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE FRAUD 
In a narrow sense, climate change tort litigation is unprecedented because, to date, 
no climate change-based tort claim has gone to trial on the merits.17 However, issues of 
scientific validity are often before federal courts. Further, sweeping allegations of 
conspiracy and the manipulation of science to defraud the public have been litigated in 
several instances, perhaps most famously in relation to the denial of the health risks 
associated with smoking by tobacco companies. Examining the successful fraud 
allegations in these cases provides insight into the strength of the current allegations 
against major petroleum, coal, and electricity companies.  
A. The Tobacco Industry 
Under RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68, a plaintiff must demonstrate: 1) the existence 
of an enterprise, 2) a pattern of unlawful behavior, 3) participation in the enterprise to 
carry out the unlawful behavior, and 4) an effect on interstate commerce.18 Liability for 
                                                                                                                                            
difference in emissions caused by lack of government and consumer action.), vacated on reh’g en banc, 
607 F.3d 1049 (2010). 
15 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.2d 863, 874–76 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding 
plaintiffs’ nuisance claims nonjusticiable political questions as a threshold matter).  
16 See e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
17 Although, in American Electric Power Co. II, the court remanded, defendants have petitioned the 
Supreme Court for review of the decision and the Solicitor General has filed a brief in support of review. 
582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).  
18 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2006). Specifically, the statute provides that  
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conspiracy and enterprise under RICO is limited to racketeering activity, which covers a 
broad range of offenses associated with organized crime. Under RICO, enterprise is 
defined as “any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and 
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”19 The 
racketeering at issue in United States v. Philip Morris was mail and wire fraud, the same 
which would be at issue in a climate change fraud case against the hydrocarbon industry 
for climate change denial.20 To violate the RICO standard, the mail communications 
themselves do not even have to be false; mail must only be used to pursue a fraudulent 
end.21  
In Philip Morris, plaintiffs accused the tobacco industry of “engaging in a lengthy, 
unlawful conspiracy to deceive the American people about the health effects of smoking 
and environmental tobacco smoke, the addictiveness of nicotine, the health benefits from 
low tar ‘light’ cigarettes, and their manipulation of the design and composition of 
cigarettes in order to sustain nicotine addiction.”22 In a massive opinion, with over 3000 
findings of fact, the court found the tobacco companies liable for mail and wire fraud and 
conspiracy, under RICO, for the representations it made to the public about smoking.23 
The court enjoined the tobacco companies from “further use of deceptive brand 
descriptors which implicitly or explicitly convey to the smoker and potential smoker that 
they are less hazardous to health than full flavor cigarettes.”24  
The court found the defendants and others participated in the conduct, 
management, and operation of an enterprise that “knowingly and intentionally engaged in 
a scheme to defraud smokers and potential smokers for purposes of financial gain, by 
                                                                                                                                            
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise 
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a 
pattern of racketeering activity .. ..“It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to 
violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 
19 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006). 
20 Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining 
money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, . . . for the 
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or 
authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the 
Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives therefrom, any such 
matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail . . . .  
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). In general, mail and wire fraud are convenient ways to establish federal question 
jurisdiction over what would otherwise be state law claims, since nearly all commercial activity will 
involve remote communication and all that is required to implicate § 1341 is that “one does an act with 
knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can 
reasonably be foreseen.” Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954).  
21 “18 U.S.C. § 1341 does not require that any mailing utilized to establish a mail fraud prosecution be 
false . . . ‘if the matter mailed is utilized in furtherance of or pursuant to the scheme to defraud.’” United 
States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 880 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting United States v. Reid, 
533 F.2d 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976), aff’d 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
22 Id. at 26–27. 
23 “[T]he Government has established that Defendants (1) have conspired together to violate the substantive 
provisions of RICO, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and (2) have in fact violated those provisions of the 
statute, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).” Id. at 27. 
24 Id. at 27.  
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making false and fraudulent statements, representations, and promises.”25 The court 
found that this scheme was intended to “defraud smokers and potential smokers in order 
to maximize their profits by preserving and enhancing the market for cigarettes, to avoid 
costly liability judgments, to derail attempts to make smoking socially unacceptable, and 
to sustain the cigarette industry.”26 This deception was implemented through a campaign 
designed to cast doubt on the emerging science connecting tobacco use with adverse 
health effects.27 The court also found deception with respect to the addictiveness of 
cigarettes and the manipulation of cigarette design to enhance delivery of nicotine.28  
B. Climate Fraud Cases  
Common law fraud requires a misrepresentation of material fact, which the 
defendant either knows is false, is unsure of accuracy of, or knows lacks basis,29 for the 
purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from acting on reasonable reliance on the 
fact to their detriment.30 In both of the climate change fraud cases, Comer v. Murphy 
Oil31 and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.,32 plaintiffs alleged that the 
public reasonably relied on industry defendants’ misrepresentations with respect to 
climate change; the misrepresentations thereby induced the public to continue burning 
fossil fuels and induced politicians to refrain from regulating greenhouse gases. 
Ultimately, the plaintiffs argued that this inaction has allowed climate change to escalate 
to the point where it has caused the alleged injury.  
In Comer v. Murphy Oil,33 plaintiffs alleged that defendant’s greenhouse gas 
emissions significantly contributed to global warming.34 The plaintiffs maintained that, 
by contributing to the rise in global temperature, defendants' actions were both a direct 
and a proximate cause of a significant increase in the strength and therefore destruction 
caused by of Hurricane Katrina.35 Plaintiffs brought claims for: 1) unjust enrichment 
under Mississippi state law, 2) civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting, 3) public and 
                                                
25 Id. at 852. 
26 Id. 
27 The false statements identified by the court included those  
deceiving consumers into starting and continuing to buy and smoke cigarettes by 
misrepresenting and concealing adverse health effects caused by smoking and exposure 
to environmental cigarette smoke, by maintaining that there was an ‘open question’ as to 
whether smoking cigarettes causes disease and other adverse effects, despite the fact that 
the Defendants knew otherwise, and by ensuring that their research, development, and 
marketing of cigarettes remained consistent with these core public positions.  
Id. 
28 Id. 
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1979).  
30 Id. at § 525.  
31 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 
F.3d 1049 (2010). 
32 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  
33 Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 
2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (2010). 
34 Third Am. Class Action Compl., Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007) 
(No. 1:05-cv-00436-LTS-RHW), at ¶¶ 3–12.  
35 Id. at ¶¶ 13–15. 
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private nuisance, 4) trespass, 5) negligence, and 6) fraudulent misrepresentation and 
concealment. The thrust of Comer’s fraud case is that defendants made materially false 
statements to the public, which the state and federal governments relied upon in refusing 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions. They further alleged that “[t]he public had a right 
to rely and did rely upon Defendants' statements, and continued to consume products in 
ways that increased Global Warming, all of which resulted in continued and increased 
profits to the Defendants. Plaintiffs' and Plaintiff Class's injuries were proximately caused 
by that reliance.”36  
In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants, through various trade organizations and think tanks, waged “a long 
campaign . . . to mislead the public about the science of global warming.”37 Specifically, 
plaintiffs alleged that defendants funded and operated a massive public relations 
campaign with the goal of casting doubt upon the then emerging consensus on climate 
change, under the cover of independent, grassroots dissent.38 They also alleged that 
defendants held, as climate experts, individuals who lacked any real credentials in the 
field of climatology.39 These alleged experts “regularly publish[ed] their marginal views 
expressing doubts about numerous aspects of climate change science in places like the 
Wall Street Journal editorial page but rarely, if ever, in peer-reviewed scientific 
journals.”40 Further, they alleged that plaintiffs knew the information they were 
disseminating through these organizations was incorrect at the time it was disseminated.41 
For example, plaintiffs point to a 1997 study, commissioned by the Edison Electric 
Institute and undertaken by independent consultants, that was suppressed for being 
unfavorable to the industry argument that climate change regulation would be too hard on 
                                                
36 Id. at ¶ 39. 
37 Compl. for Damages Demand for Jury Trial, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 
F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08 1138 SBA), 2008 WL 594713, at ¶¶ 189, 190. Plaintiffs 
sought “monetary damages for defendants' past and ongoing contributions to global warming, a public 
nuisance, and damages caused by certain defendants' acts in furthering a conspiracy to suppress the 
awareness of the link between these emissions and global warming.” Id. at ¶ 6.  
38 Id. at ¶ 191. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41  ICE [Information Council on the Environment] undertook radio advertising blitzes and mass 
mailings that attacked the proponents of global warming and used unscientific tactics like calling 
attention to small geographic regions with temperature trends that ran against the overall warming 
as somehow disproving global warming. Internal documents from ICE revealed that the goal was 
to ‘reposition global warming as theory’ not fact and was designed to target ‘older, less educated 
males from larger households who are not typically active information-seekers’ and ‘younger, 
lower-income women.’  
Id. at ¶ 194. 
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the economy.42 They also alleged that other coalitions supported by the greenhouse gas 
emitting industry had similar information on hand, showing knowledge of falsity.43 
The connection between the alleged fraud and the concrete and particularized 
injury, in Native Village, was pled as follows: 1) defendants are responsible for “a 
substantial portion of the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that have caused global 
warming”;44 2) global warming caused plaintiffs’ injuries;45 3) defendants “conspired to 
create a false scientific debate about global warming in order to deceive the public”;46 4) 
the goal of this campaign was to stem growing public concern and prevent political action 
that would require defendants to change the way they do business47; to the extent that the 
public and politicians relied on this misinformation, it was to their detriment.48  
In Kivalina, the court’s dismissal of these claims was consistent with its dismissal 
of all of the tort claims in that case based on finding a nonjusticiable political question.49 
The court found that the plaintiff’s nuisance claim presented such a complex question of 
causation that it evaded judicially manageable standards of reaching a reasoned 
resolution and presented threshold political questions that would be better addressed by 
Congress.50 In Comer, the court lumped plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims together with their, 
more generalized, unjust enrichment claims and therefore failed to adequately distinguish 
between nuisance claims and conspiracy claims with respect to prudential standing.51  
                                                
42  In 1997, EEI [Edison Electric Institute] commissioned a study by a reputable consulting firm, ICF 
Kaiser, to assess the impact of limiting carbon dioxide emissions on the price of electricity. The 
results showed only a modest impact on price—an impact that would be made up by concomitant 
conservation savings. EEI buried the study “because it's not damaging enough” according to an 
EEI source, and there were discussions at EEI about shredding all copies of the study.  
Id. at ¶ 195. 
43  In December, 1995 the GCC [Global Climate Coalition], via its Science and Technology Advisory 
Committee (GCC-STAC), drafted a primer on the science of global warming for GCC members. 
The draft primer included a seven-page section that reviewed the ‘contrarian’ arguments and 
theories and listed a ‘counter-argument’ for every single one of them. The description of the 
counter-arguments demonstrate the GCC and its members were well aware that the contrarian 
theories, which they publicly touted as casting doubt on the science of global warming, were 
incorrect. 
Id. ¶ 205. 
44 Compl. for Damages Demand for Jury Trial, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 
F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. CV 08 1138 SBA), 2008 WL 594713, at ¶ 3. 
45 Id. at ¶ 4. 
46 Id. at ¶ 5. 
47 Id. at ¶ 269 “At all times the Conspiracy Defendants were concerned that the public would become 
concerned by global warming and that the growing concern would force a change in the Conspiracy 
Defendants' behavior which would be costly. Delaying these costs was the major objective of the 
conspiracies described herein.” Id. 
48 Id. at ¶ 273. 
49 Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
50 Id. at 876. 
51 Third Am. Class Action Compl., Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 
2007) (No. 1:05-cv-00436-LTS-RHW), at ¶¶ 24–26 (“This conspiracy delayed and otherwise interfered 
with individual and government action to address Global Warming, and consequently contributed to 
Plaintiffs’ injuries . . . .”) (internal footnote omitted).  
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C. Parallel Campaigns 
There is an interesting parallel between the tobacco tactics, ultimately found to be 
unlawful, and the climate change-denial tactics alleged by plaintiffs and by journalists.52 
One common thread is the use of trade organizations to coordinate their information 
campaign and provide distance between the campaign and the source of funding. For the 
tobacco industry, these organizations were the Tobacco Institute (later renamed the 
Council for Tobacco Research) and the Center for Indoor Air Research, Inc. (CIAR). 
These organizations were subsequently dissolved as part of a settlement with forty-six 
states’ attorneys general in 1998.53  
These tobacco organizations have eerie doppelgangers in the climate change 
industries. In the early 1990s, the Western Fuels Association, a coal industry trade 
association, together with the Edison Electric Institute, created the Information Council 
on the Environment (ICE).54 ICE hired a public relations firm to conduct a campaign to 
cast doubt on climate change science.55 The organization hired spokespeople with 
scientific expertise in areas other than climatology to lend legitimacy to their campaign.56 
ICE attempted to spin the increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide as beneficial to plant 
life and even went so far as to make a documentary film that was widely distributed to 
universities on the subject.57  
The fossil fuel industry has taken this distancing a step further. Major greenhouse 
gas emitting industry groups have been accused of “astroturfing” in order to cast doubt on 
climate change science and undermine calls for regulation. “Astroturfing” is the term 
coined to describe the tactic where established special interests organize a campaign to 
create the appearance of a grassroots movement. The Advancement of Sound Science 
Coalition (TASSC) is such an organization.58 The group was originally developed by a 
public relations firm, APCO Worldwide, for Philip Morris to counter scientific research 
on the dangers of tobacco use.59 The group reached out to a number of corporations with 
science-related image problems, including major petroleum and chemical corporations.60 
The firm purposely targeted their campaign to smaller cities where they would receive 
less pushback from experts and reporters.61 The American Petroleum Institute (API) and 
the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) are also among the organizations that have 
                                                
52 ExxonMobil has attracted a particularly large amount of attention for its spending in connection with 
climate change denial. So much so, that Greenpeace has dedicated blog space entirely to the company’s 
spending habits. See ExxonSecrets, GREENPEACE, http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/campaigns/global-
warming-and-energy/exxon-secrets/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). 
53 GOVERNOR’S OFFICE, supra note 10, at 1, 3. 




58 Defending Hot Air: TASSC Takes on Global Warming, PR WATCH, available at 
http://www.prwatch.org/prwissues/1997Q3/tassc.html (last visited May 6, 2012).  
59 Id. 
60 HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 41. 
61 Id. at 38–39. 
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been accused of providing a pseudo-independent front for the hydrocarbon industry in 
order to spread misinformation about climate change science without raising suspicions.62  
One key difference between the two misinformation campaigns is that while 
tobacco industry scientists compiled a wealth of data,63 the fossil fuel industry’s 
campaign on climate skepticism is notable for its paucity of original data or experts in the 
specific field of climate research.64 The tobacco industry was infamous for attacking 
independent studies on the one hand, while vigorously arming itself with in-house 
counter research in the event of litigation on the other.65 Records, leaked in the course of 
tobacco litigation, revealed that Philip Morris specifically vetted scientists hired to 
research the health effects of tobacco use for their leanings, and prospective researchers 
were informed their work would be filtered through lawyers.66 
Conversely, the fossil fuel industry has maintained the climate change debate via 
petitions, editorials,67 and reconstructions of other researchers’ datasets. An infamous 
example of science by petition is the Oregon Institute’s petition of 34,000 scientists who 
believe climate change is not anthropogenic.68 The petition was designed to undermine 
the scientific consensus in support of anthropogenic warming. It created the impression 
of a debate without raising any issues or even presenting the credentials of its signatories. 
A random sampling of thirty signatories later revealed that, of the signatories that would 
return calls, eleven still agreed with the petition, six would not sign it knowing what they 
know now, and three do not remember signing anything to that effect.69  
The most famous data reconstruction involved a statistical reconstruction of a 
famous graph aggregating climate data from various sources to chart global climate 
change since the year 1400; it depicted a steep warming trend in the twentieth century.70 
The study, conducted by retired mining executive Steven McIntyre71 and economist Ross 
                                                
62 Jeff Nesmith, Foes of Global Warming Theory Have Energy Ties, SEATTLEPI (June 1, 2003), 
http://www.seattlepi.com/national/article/Foes-of-global-warming-theory-have-energy-ties-
1116097.php#ixzz1u48lS5QE; Scientist to CEI: You Used My Research To “Confuse and Mislead,” 
FACTCHECK.ORG (May 26, 2006), http://www.factcheck.org/misleading-
ads/scientist_to_cei_you_used_my_research.html. 
63 See, e.g., Luben G. Anceloff, Cigarette Smoking is Not the Cause of Cancer: Effect of Nicotine and Tar 
on Nucleic Acids of Rat Lung and Spleen, 23 THE NUCLEUS 56 (1980), available at 
http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/wbc88d00/pdf;jsessionid=5D64BA2B7D367C37DC48D8B464F65F3C.to
bacco03. 
64 HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 99–133. 
65 See NAOMI ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT 21 (2010) (observing that research 
was already underway to develop a safer cigarette at the same time the industry insisted there was no 
significant health risk.).  
66 John Schwartz, Philip Morris Sought Experts to Cloud Issue, Memo Details, WASH. POST, May 9, 1997, 
at A02. 
67 See, e.g., Patrick J. Michaels, Record Low for Climate Science, CATO INSTITUTE (Aug. 31, 2008), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/record-low-climate-science; Patrick J. Michaels, Global 
Warming Gomorrah in Hell: Welcome to Washington, CATO INSTITUTE (Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/global-warming-gomorrah-hell-welcome-washington. 
68 HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 88–89. 
69 Id. at 91.  
70 Steven McIntyre & Ross McKirtrick, Corrections to the Mann et al. (1998) Proxy Data Base and 
Northern Hemisphereic Average Temperature Series, 14 ENERGY & ENV’T 751 (2003). 
71 HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 111. 
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McKitrick,72 purported to show a fatal error in the way the proxy data was handled. They 
suggested that the hockey stick shape of the graph was a product of error and unjustified 
manipulation of the source data.73 Politicians quickly picked up the study, and it triggered 
a Senate hearing on the subject where Senator Inhofe declared global warming to be “the 
greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people.”74 Meanwhile, despite the sound 
and fury, the results of the original study have been affirmed by the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences.75 This episode illustrates just how easily politics can manipulate 
the public discourse on scientific issues. The industry campaign against climate change 
science very much follows in the footsteps of the tobacco industry, but it also learned 
from and advanced building upon these tactics by creating even more perceived distance 
between the source of the information and its dissemination.  
II. CLIMATE CHANGE TORT, JUSTICIABILITY, AND STANDING  
A. Climate Change in the Courtroom  
Despite striking similarities between tobacco and climate change fraud allegations, 
no tort action based on damages caused by climate change has defeated dismissal and 
gone to trial on the merits. To date, every attempt to bring a cause of action, based on a 
climate change-related tort injury, has either been dismissed for lack of standing or for 
lack of jurisdiction under the political question doctrine, or both. The notable exception is 
American Electric Power Co. II,76 which is on remand after interlocutory review by the 
Supreme Court.  
The major points of the political question doctrine are laid out in Baker v. Carr.77 
Baker identifies six factors used to determine whether a case is justiciable. These include:  
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.78 
                                                
72 Id.  
73 McIntyre & McKirtrick, supra note 70, at 766.  
74 Andrew C. Revkin, Politics Reasserts Itself in the Debate Over Climate Change and Its Hazards, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/05/science/earth/05CLIM.html?ex=1061081071&ei=1&en=a7013e07ce
beb1fa. 
75 Geoff Brumfiel, Academy Affirms Hockey-Stick Graph, 441 NATURE 1032, 1032–33 (2006). 
76 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. 
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
77 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
78 Id.  
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The factors most often at issue in climate change cases are a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards and the impossibility of deciding without an 
initial policy determination.79  
The first major climate change tort case was Connecticut v. American Electric 
Power Co. (AEP I).80 In AEP I, several states filed suit against American Electric Power 
Company, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and other energy-related corporations for 
public nuisance under federal common law or, in the alternative, state common law.81 
Plaintiffs sought an injunction to cap greenhouse gas emissions.82 The Southern District 
of New York granted defendant’s motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because 
the case raised nonjusticiable political questions.83 The Southern District reasoned that 
“[t]he scope and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals the transcendently 
legislative nature of this litigation.”84 The district court’s concern focused mainly on the 
determinations that carrying out such an injunction would entail.85 For example, the court 
believed that determining the level of emissions at which to set the requested cap would 
be beyond the function of the judiciary.86 Ultimately, the court interpreted the absence of 
legislative action on climate change as congressional intent not to act.87 
In addition to the political question of nonjusticiability, standing was a persistent 
problem for early climate change tort cases. The requirements for constitutional standing 
are laid out in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.88 Under Lujan,  
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and 
(b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical[.]’” . . . Second, 
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the 
                                                
79 See, e.g., Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 874–76 (N.D. Cal. 
2009).  
80 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. I), 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 270. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 272. 
85 See id.  
86 See id. Specifically the Court found:  
Such relief would, at a minimum, require this Court to: (1) determine the appropriate level at 
which to cap the carbon dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine the appropriate 
percentage reduction to impose upon Defendants; (3) create a schedule to implement those 
reductions; (4) determine and balance the implications of such relief on the United States’ ongoing 
negotiations with other nations concerning global climate change; (5) assess and measure available 
alternative energy resources; and (6) determine and balance the implications of such relief on the 
United States’ energy sufficiency and thus its national security—all without an “initial policy 
determination” having been made by the elected branches.  
Id. at 272.  
87 Id. at 274 (stating “their specific refusal to impose the limits on carbon dioxide emissions Plaintiffs now 
seek to impose by judicial fiat confirm that making the ‘initial policy determination[s]’ addressing global 
climate change is an undertaking for the political branches.).  
88 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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independent action of some third party not before the court.” . . . Third, it 
must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will 
be “redressed by a favorable decision.”89 
Prior to Massachusetts v. EPA, the question of whether any plaintiff could establish 
particularity, traceability, and redressability sufficient to support federal jurisdiction for a 
climate change injury was still up in the air after AEP I was dismissed on political 
question grounds.90  
The next major climate change decision, Massachusetts v. EPA,91 shed more light 
on constitutional standing within the context of climate change litigation. Massachusetts 
granted the State of Massachusetts special standing to challenge EPA’s decision not to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act.92 The Court held that federal 
statutory intrusion into traditionally state police power prerogatives gave Massachusetts a 
“concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as 
arbitrary and capricious.”93 The decision also contained important dicta concerning the 
justiciability of climate change-related issues. With respect to the requirement of a 
concrete and particularized injury, the Court, in dicta, stated that “[t]he harms associated 
with climate change are serious and well recognized.”94 The Court also determined that 
the global nature of the phenomenon did not preclude a finding of particularized injury.95 
The Court noted “[t]hat these climate-change risks are ‘widely shared’ does not minimize 
Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this litigation.”96 The Court also dismissed 
popular objections to allowing standing for climate change cases based on causation and 
redressability, dismissing as “erroneous” the “assumption that a small incremental step, 
because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum.”97 This notion 
of incremental impact also carried over to the redressability requirement.98 The decision 
was influential both in the finding of standing itself and the Court’s notice of 
anthropogenic climate change in its application of standing principles.  
The next major climate change case, and the first to raise issues of fraud, was 
Comer I.99 In Comer I, plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed sua sponte after the court 
determined at an initial hearing that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring their claims 
                                                
89 Id. at 560–61. 
90 AEP I, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 271 n.6.  
91 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 520. 
94 Id. at 521. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 522. 
97 Id. at 524. “While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by itself reverse global 
warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps to 
slow or reduce it.” Id. at 525. 
98 “The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That risk would be reduced to some 
extent if petitioners received the relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing to 
challenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.” Id. at 526. 
99 Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer I), 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. 2007), rev’d sub nom, 585 F.3d 855 (5th 
Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).  
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and that their claims presented nonjusticiable political questions.100 While the decision 
was later vacated en banc, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion on appeal provides some interesting 
insight into how, building upon Massachusetts v. EPA101 and AEP II,102 justiciable 
climate change claims could be developed. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the 
Southern District of Mississippi’s dismissal of the case.103 The Fifth Circuit found that 
“plaintiffs have standing to assert their public and private nuisance, trespass, and 
negligence claims, and that none of these claims present nonjusticiable political 
questions; but we conclude that their unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, 
and civil conspiracy claims must be dismissed for prudential standing reasons.”104 
The Fifth Circuit divided the plaintiffs’ claims between the claims arising out of 
climate change itself, which relied on a causal link between defendants’ greenhouse gas 
emissions and Hurricane Katrina, and the fraud claims. The court found that “the first set 
of claims . . . assert private, common-law claims of the sort that have been long 
recognized to give rise to standing,”105 as opposed to more generalized public law claims. 
Where defendants challenged plaintiffs’ standing based on the traceability of the harm 
back to their actions, the court declined to address the merits of plaintiffs’ causation 
claim, noting that at the pleading stage, plaintiffs’ factual allegations are taken as true.106  
However, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ fraud-related claims on federal prudential 
standing grounds as generalized grievances.107 The prudential standing doctrine limits 
federal jurisdiction where 1) “a litigant[] rais[es] another person's legal rights”; 2) the 
plaintiff pleads “generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the 
representative branches”; or 3) the plaintiff’s complaint falls outside of “the zone of 
interests protected by the law invoked.”108 The court found plaintiffs’ fraud claims to 
“involve every purchaser of petrochemicals and the entire American citizenry because the 
plaintiffs are essentially alleging a massive fraud on the political system resulting in the 
failure of environmental regulators to impose proper costs on the defendants,” and 
therefore plaintiffs lacked the particularity required to confer standing.109  
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp.110 was also dismissed based on 
political question nonjusticiability.111 In Native Village, an Inuit village brought suit 
under federal common law nuisance against major petroleum companies for damages 
attributed to climate change.112 The Northern District of California found that the issue 
                                                
100 Id. 
101 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
102 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. 
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
103 Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer II) 585 F.3d 855, 880 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 F.3d 
1049 (2010). 
104 Id. at 860. 
105 Id. at 863 n.3. 
106 Id. at 864–65. 
107 Id. at 867–68. 
108 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).  
109 Comer v. Murphy Oil (Comer II) 585 F.3d 855, 869 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated on reh’g en banc, 607 F.3d 
1049 (2010). 
110 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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did not implicate a textual commitment to another branch of government.113 Looking at 
the questions that the court would have to resolve in order to determine whether the 
petroleum companies were responsible for “unreasonable interference with a right 
common to the general public,”114 the court ultimately determined there was a lack of 
judicially manageable standards that could be employed to resolve the dispute.115 The 
court came to this conclusion despite the fact that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
rejected the very same argument on appeal in Connecticut v. American Electric Power 
Co. (AEP II).116 The court also found the case to require an initial policy determination 
that would prove “[e]qually problematic for Plaintiffs” due to the enormous policy 
implications of a determination of liability.117 The court explained that “by pressing this 
lawsuit, Plaintiffs are in effect asking this Court to make a political judgment that the two 
dozen Defendants named in th[e] action should be the only ones to bear the cost of 
contributing to global warming.”118 Furthermore, the court found that plaintiffs lacked 
Article III standing because the harm claimed was not “fairly traceable” to the 
defendants.119 
Nine days before the Northern District of California ruled in Native Village, the 
Second Circuit handed down their decision on appeal from AEP I. The ninety-page 
decision vacated the district court’s dismissal of the case and remanded the case back 
down based on its determinations that: 1) the case did not lack “judicially-discoverable 
and manageable standards;”120 2) the plaintiffs’ tort claim did not turn on an initial policy 
decision beyond judicial discretion;121 3) no other Baker factor was implicated;122 4) 
plaintiffs have standing to bring suit;123 5) plaintiffs stated a claim of federal common law 
nuisance;124 and 6) plaintiffs’ common law nuisance claim has not been displaced by 
                                                
113 Id. at 873. 
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). 
115 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp.2d at 874–76. 
116 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. 
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
117 Native Village of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876.  
118 Id. at 877. 
119 Id. at 877–78. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the fact that each defendant contributed to 
their injury by contributing significant greenhouse gas emissions satisfied the causation requirement of 
Article III standing. Further, the court found that plaintiffs’ injuries lie outside of the zone of defendants’ 
discharge of pollutants. Id. at 881. 
120 AEP II, 582 F.3d at 326 (“Defendants’ argument is undermined by the fact that federal courts have 
successfully adjudicated complex common law public nuisance cases for over a century. The first cases 
involved States bringing claims against other States, or against private parties in other States, in the 
Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction.”). 
121 “The district court's reliance on a refusal to legislate results in a decision resting on particularly unstable 
ground.” Id. at 330. 
122 Id. at 331–32. 
123 Id. at 333–49. The court, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 
found that plaintiffs qualified for parens patriae standing, and that they sufficiently alleged an injury in fact 
that was actual and imminent, fairly traceable to the defendants, and redressable. Id. at 333–49. 
124 Id. at 352–71. 
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federal statute.125 Importantly, the court held the presence of complex scientific issues 
presented no obstacle to jurisdiction.126  
The Supreme Court recently handed down its review of AEP II. An evenly divided 
Court affirmed the Second Circuit’s assertion of jurisdiction over the case with half the 
Court following the majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, and the other half finding 
a lack of standing in line with the Massachusetts dissent.127 However, the Court reversed 
and remanded the Second Circuit to the extent that the federal common law cause of 
action had been preempted by EPA’s steps to regulate greenhouse gases.128  
B. The Unique Questions Raised by Climate Change Tort Generally and Fraud in 
Particular 
While the issues of justiciability and prudential standing are far from settled with 
respect to climate change tort law, even courts that have been receptive to climate 
change-based nuisance claims have dismissed climate change fraud allegations.129 Both 
courts and commentators have been torn between viewing climate change like any other 
complex causal chain and viewing it as so enormous and complex as to be fundamentally 
outside of the scope of adjudication.130 However, even courts that have been receptive to 
entertaining climate change as a causal mechanism resulting in concrete and 
particularized injury in a nuisance context have not been willing to apply the same 
analysis to fraud claims.131 This is largely because courts have viewed these fraud 
allegations as general injuries in and of themselves rather than connecting them to the 
concrete and particularized injury pled by plaintiffs.  
                                                
125 Id.  
126  That the district court may be called upon to decide causation issues and apply a remedy does not 
remove the case from the ambit of nuisance actions. Federal courts have long been up to the task 
of assessing complex scientific evidence in cases where the cause of action was based either upon 
the federal common law or upon a statute. They are adept in balancing the equities and in 
rendering judgment.  
Id. at 329. 
127 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011). 
128 Id. at 2537. 
129 Compare Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer II), 585 F.3d 855, 868 (5th Cir. 2009) reh’g en banc 
granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), on reh'g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Each of the 
plaintiffs’ second set of claims presents a generalized grievance that is more properly dealt with by the 
representative branches and common to all consumers of petrochemicals and the American public”) with 
Id. at 867 (“In their nuisance, trespass and negligence claims, the plaintiffs have clearly satisfied the first 
and third constitutional minimum standing requirements. These state common-law tort claims, in which 
plaintiffs allege that they sustained actual, concrete injury in fact to their particular lands and property, can 
be redressed by the compensatory and punitive damages they seek for those injuries . . . , and the plaintiffs’ 
first set of claims satisfies the traceability requirement and the standing inquiry.”)  
130 Compare James R. May, Climate Change, Constitutional Consignment, and the Political Question 
Doctrine, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 919 (2008) with Donald G. Gifford, No ‘Ordinary Tort’—Climate Change 
Tort Actions and the Supreme Court, TORTSPROF BLOG (Sept. 20, 2010) 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2010/09/guest-blogger-don-gifford-on-no-ordinary-tortclimate-
change-tort-actions-and-the-supreme-court.html. 
131 Comer II, 585 F.3d at 869 (finding plaintiffs’ claims of fraud to be based on too generalized and 
theoretical of an injury).  
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Generally, commentators object to climate change-based causes of action because 
climate change litigants seek to redress public interests in a branch of government 
designed to resolve private interests.132 To these commentators, climate change-based tort 
litigation pushes the boundaries of Article III jurisdiction, doing so in ways that violate 
the prudential standing prohibition on generalized grievances and violate political 
question doctrine by confronting issues that would be best handled by Congress.133  
However, some commentators have pointed out, and some courts have recognized, 
that the global nature of climate change does not necessarily preclude it from resulting in 
concrete and particularized injuries.134 These commentators believe that, so long as 
causation is scientifically sound, the injury could be redressed by the legal system in a 
way similar to that of other injuries with complex chains of causation.135 These 
commentators see climate change tort as an extension of the environmental tort that 
preceded modern environmental statutes.136 The notion of climate change as a causal 
mechanism that can result in concrete and particularized injury has gained resonance with 
some federal courts since traceability, redressability, and concreteness requirements were 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.137  
While fraud carries its own problems of standing, it avoids problems that other 
causes of action pose. For instance, climate change fraud claims avoid federal preemption 
problems. When states initiated litigation in AEP I138 in 2005, the federal government had 
previously taken a strong stance against setting mandatory constraints on greenhouse gas 
emissions.139 At that point in time, many climate change-related suits either pushed for 
government action140 or requested judicial remedies that would be preempted by 
legislative or administrative action.141 However, the Environmental Protection Agency 
has acted upon the Supreme Court’s 2009 Massachusetts v. EPA decision by developing 
and implementing greenhouse gas reporting requirements and limitations for new 
                                                
132 See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 130. These commentators see climate change as falling under a different 
category of activist litigation, seeking from the courts determinations that the plaintiffs could not achieve in 
the political branches. Id. 
133 “Public interest tort litigation, unlike ordinary torts, raises serious justiciability concerns whether 
analyzed under either standing or the political question doctrine.” Id. 
134 E.g., May, supra note 130. 
135 Id.  
136 See Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental Common Law, 34 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 6 (2007) (stating that “[m]odern environmental law grew out of the common 
law tort system, and modern regulation of pollution arose in an effort to deal with the inadequacies of the 
common law”). 
137 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. 
II), 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) 
(relying heavily on Massachusetts v. EPA for its standing analysis).  
138 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
139 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
140 See, e.g., id.  
141 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“The scope 
and magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals the transcendently legislative nature of this litigation. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to cap carbon dioxide emissions and mandate annual reductions of an as-yet-
unspecified percentage.”). 
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stationary sources.142 This potential preemption formed the cornerstone of the Solicitor 
General’s argument in defense of the Tennessee Valley Authority in American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut, a position that the Court ultimately found persuasive.143 
However, because fraud-related tort actions do not entail remedies that would act directly 
upon greenhouse gas emissions, and federal fraud statutes are not written to preempt state 
action,144 climate litigants would not run the same risk of having their suits federally 
preempted. Further, unlike some of the remedies sought in public nuisance cases, any 
injunctive remedy for fraud would not require the court to act in a legislative function to 
establish or oversee emissions caps, which triggers separation of powers and justiciability 
concerns. In AEP II, the Fifth Circuit quickly pointed out that part of the reason that the 
case was more judicially palatable than prior climate change nuisance cases was that 
“[t]he plaintiffs d[id] not assert any federal or public law actions and d[id] not seek 
injunctive relief.”145 Thus, to the extent that judges fear legislating from the bench, the 
still somewhat novel idea of causes of actions based on climate change are less daunting 
if compensation comes down to the monetary value of the injury.  
III. IF TOBACCO FRAUD WAS JUSTICIABLE, WHY NOT CLIMATE FRAUD? 
While tobacco litigants struggled for decades to win a case based on tobacco’s 
connection to cancer, the complex causal chain between exposure to tobacco smoke and 
disease did not prove to be an insurmountable barrier to adjudication. Yet the complex 
causal chain between greenhouse gas emissions and climate change-related injuries, such 
as severe weather and sea-level rise, has. Climate change fraud litigation faces two major 
standing barriers and a political question barrier. There are two major standing issues that 
                                                
142 A little over a year after Massachusetts, the EPA released an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(ANPR): Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act soliciting comments on how the 
EPA should proceed. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 
74 Fed. Reg. 55292 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified 74 Fed. Reg. § 32744). Following the ANPR, 
the EPA initiated the rulemaking process to determine whether or not greenhouse gases endangered human 
health and welfare such that the EPA would have a duty to regulate under the CAA. This was decided in 
the affirmative on December 7, 2009 in a final rule finding the threat of climate change sufficient to 
warrant a finding of endangerment. 74 Fed. Reg. § 32744 (July 18, 2009). Because there is overlap between 
the waiver and the possibility of heightened new vehicle emissions regulations under Massachusetts, the 
waiver hearing was originally stayed until the Supreme Court decided Massachusetts. “The two kinds of 
standards can overlap significantly, in that the technology used to increase fuel efficiency will also lead to 
reductions in emissions of one of the GHGs—CO2 —but they are not the same legal requirements and the 
regulations do not apply in the same manner.” Id. at § 32751–52. On April 1, 2010, the EPA finalized the 
new fuel economy standards sought by the plaintiffs in Massachusetts. Id. 
143 Brief for Tennessee Valley Authority Supporting Petitioners, Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 
S.Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 10-174). The Solicitor General asked the Court to reverse the appellate court’s 
decision in AEP II and remand back to the court to consider whether the plaintiffs’ claims are generalized 
grievances that would be better addressed by the political branches and barred as a matter of prudential 
standing, and also whether regulations implemented by the EPA after Massachusetts v. EPA preempt the 
plaintiffs’ common law claims. The Court ended up reversing on those very grounds. Am. Elec. Power Co., 
Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
144 Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 392 (7th Cir. 1984), aff’d, 473 
U.S. 606 (1985) (“Congress enacted RICO in order to supplement, not supplant, the available remedies 
since it thought those remedies offered too little protection for the victims.”). 
145 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA (Comer II), 585 F.3d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 2009). 
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tobacco fraud litigation did not have to grapple with to the same degree. First, identifying 
plaintiffs with particularized injuries was never a serious concern for tobacco fraud. A 
lawyer pursuing the tobacco industry need only look for smokers who died from or were 
suffering from health effects linked to smoking. In contrast, both the global nature of 
climate change and the general nature of the mass fraud allegations make it more difficult 
to identify a climate change fraud plaintiff with a particularized injury. Second, while the 
causal chain between tobacco use and cancer was fiercely litigated,146 the case that 
consumers would smoke less, or individual smokers would not have started smoking but 
for ignorance of the health risks, is relatively straightforward. Conversely, the numerous 
political and economic factors at play in both the consumer and political choices related 
to climate change make it difficult to argue that greenhouse gas emissions would be 
lower but for the industry consciously sponsoring misinformation. These concerns could 
both be addressed by extending the reasoning applied in Massachusetts v. EPA.147 With 
respect to standing concerns about generalized grievances, the legal reasoning favoring 
states as climate change plaintiffs in climate change nuisance cases—that there is a 
sovereign interest in the protection of public resources (e.g. coastline)—can be applied to 
fraud claims as well. With respect to but for causation concerns, the notion of small, but 
significant, contribution elaborated in Massachusetts v. EPA could be similarly extended 
to fraud claims.  
There is also the issue of political question doctrine. When it comes to climate 
change-related litigation, courts often conflate the scientific question of whether or not an 
injury is attributable to the defendant’s actions with the political question of how to 
regulate greenhouse gases.  
A. Identifying a Plaintiff with Standing  
As the Fifth Circuit observed in Comer II, the largest obstacle to a successful 
climate change-based fraud case is standing.148 When powerful special interests engage in 
massive campaigns to confuse the public about important issues everyone is injured, but 
the mere existence of injury does not guarantee jurisdiction. In tobacco fraud litigation, 
the class of plaintiffs often consists of every smoker within a certain place and timeframe. 
Yet standing is rarely challenged in tobacco fraud litigation because the connection 
between the influence of the deception on consumer choices and the injury is clear: the 
product is more directly dangerous than the manufacturers represented. Assuming climate 
change plaintiffs’ factual claims have merit, the same could be considered true for 
climate change: the products (carbon based fuels, the internal combustion engine, etc.) 
contributed to a risk that was downplayed by those who profited from the consumption. 
But the major challenge for climate change plaintiffs is drawing a concrete and 
particularized nexus between the deception and their injuries.  
                                                
146 David A. Curran, Funds v. Big Tobacco and the Proximate-Cause Issue: A Framework for Derivative 
Injuries, 80 TEX. L. REV. 393, 395 (2001) (“Between 1954 and 1994, 813 claims were filed against tobacco 
companies.”). 
147 Comer II, 585 F.3d at 869 (finding plaintiffs’ claims of fraud to be based on too generalized and 
theoretical an injury).  
148 Id. 
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The causal issues posed by climate change generally have not proven a complete 
bar to prudential standing.149 However, for fraud claims, the reliance/injury causal 
connection becomes slightly more attenuated and courts have been more reluctant to 
connect the misrepresentation back to the original injury.150 In Comer II, in describing the 
general nature of the plaintiff’s complaint, the court fixated on the enormous scope of the 
misrepresentation, observing that the claim involves “every purchaser of petrochemicals 
and the entire American citizenry,” rather than looking for the causal chain that connects 
the misrepresentation to the particularized injury pled.151 The causal connection between 
consumer and political choices made in reliance on industry representations may be more 
attenuated than the connection between carbon emissions and nuisance the court accepted 
in the first part of its decision.152 However, the court does not even reach that point. It 
finds only a generalized grievance because it drops the chain before it reaches the injury. 
The Fifth Circuit is, so to speak, so overwhelmed by the forest that it misses the trees. As 
a result, the court fails to adequately explain: 1) why the nuisance claim is adequately 
particularized but the fraud claim is not, where you have the same injured parties; and 2) 
why any of the rationales behind prudential standing apply. While precedent does not 
favor future climate fraud plaintiffs, as explained below, the judicial obstacle of 
prudential standing is not necessarily insurmountable.  
Tobacco litigation—in particular, Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. 
Philip Morris, Inc.—is informative on the reliance causal nexus.153 In Laborers Local, 
labor union health and welfare trust funds sued major tobacco corporations for conspiring 
to deceive the general public about the danger and addictiveness of smoking, which 
consequently cost the health fund millions of dollars in added health expenses.154 
Defendants moved to dismiss the case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because the causal 
connection between plaintiff’s allegations and their injuries was too attenuated.155 The 
court looked at the purpose of requiring a direct relationship between conduct and injury. 
The court noted that (1) the more distance between cause and injury, the more difficult it 
is to determine the extent of the contribution to the injury;156 (2) allowing indirect causes 
of action increased the risk of duplicative relief;157 and (3) it does not put forth the 
                                                
149 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007) (finding that the threat of erosion and sea 
level rise to coastal land owned by the state as a result of climate change was a sufficiently concrete and 
particularized injury for standing purposes); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 
582 F.3d 309, 341–42 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) 
(noting California’s particularized injury of declined snowpack); Comer II, 585 F.3d at 863 (“In their 
nuisance, trespass and negligence claims, the plaintiffs have clearly satisfied the first and third 
constitutional minimum standing requirements. These state common-law tort claims, in which plaintiffs 
allege that they sustained actual, concrete injury in fact to their particular lands and property, can be 
redressed by the compensatory and punitive damages they seek for those injuries.”).  
150 Comer II, 585 F.3d at 869.  
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 860.  
153 Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, 7 F. Supp.2d 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
154 Id. at 282. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 285. 
157 Id.  
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plaintiff that would be in the best position to vindicate that injury.158 The court held that 
while there may be other parties with incentive to bring fraud claims against the tobacco 
companies, no other party would have the same incentive to “vindicate the harm to 
plaintiffs—their reduced ability to minimize health-care expenses and their assumption of 
the financial burden of tobacco-related disease,” and these particular harms would go 
without remedy and without ability to bring suit.159  
To date, the only climate change plaintiffs that have found injuries particularized 
enough for a cause of action have been states who have lost or stand to lose property as a 
result of a natural system altered by climate change.160 Some scholars see Massachusetts 
v. EPA as a move toward applying a more precautionary approach to standing.161 A broad 
reading of Massachusetts v. EPA gives states a special solicitude to protect sovereign 
interests with respect to climate change in court.162 This would be an extension of the 
notion that “a State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being-both 
physical and economic-of its residents in general.”163 Such an application of state 
standing would strongly favor allowing states to bring climate change fraud suits on 
behalf of the consumer and property interests of their citizens. 
Conversely, a more narrow interpretation of state standing in a climate change 
context recognizes a limited procedural right to parens patriae standing where there is 
field preemption of a state sovereign interest.164 In the case of Massachusetts v. EPA, this 
was the Clean Air Act’s preemption of greenhouse gas regulation.165 This reasoning 
could not be applied to climate change fraud because there is no field preemption 
preventing states from passing their own laws to promote greater transparency. This 
reading has not been favored because the Court expressly conferred standing based on 
more than just a procedural right.166 In AEP II, the court allowed parens patriae standing 
based on the state’s quasi-sovereign interests in the health and welfare of its citizens, 
                                                
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (parens patriae interest in threat of loss of 
coastline due to sea level rise); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 
309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (parens patriae 
interest in threat to state natural resources).  
161 Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 494, 511 (2008) 
(“Courts should find that the ‘injury’ prong of standing is satisfied where the plaintiff can show that the 
harm that it might suffer would be catastrophic and irreversible, and that its occurrence is subject to great 
uncertainty.”). 
162 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (citing Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), the 
Court recognized that a “[State] independent interest ‘in all the earth and air within its domain’ supported 
federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts’ well-founded desire to preserve its sovereign 
territory today.”).  
163 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).  
164 Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 273, 320–21 (2007). 
165 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519 (“Massachusetts cannot invade Rhode Island to force reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions, it cannot negotiate an emissions treaty with China or India, and in some 
circumstances the exercise of its police powers to reduce in-state motor-vehicle emissions might well be 
pre-empted.”). 
166 “Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting its quasi-sovereign interests, the 
Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis.” Id. at 520 (emphasis added). 
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consistent with the broader understanding of climate change standing.167 Such quasi-
sovereign interests are also at stake in a climate change fraud case. Thus, unlike the 
private litigants in Comer,168 a climate change-based fraud claim might stand a better 
chance of adjudication if brought by a state on behalf of its citizens.  
B. Causation  
The second standing issue that is more challenging in a climate fraud context is 
causation. Even if a state bringing the cause of action helps establish standing under a 
more relaxed inquiry, a climate change fraud plaintiff is going to have a more difficult 
time than a tobacco plaintiff establishing that there would be no injury absent a 
defendant’s actions. The causal reasoning of the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA could be 
extended to a fraud context to address this problem. In Massachusetts, the Court found 
that, in the context of Massachusetts’ parens patriae claim, traceability and redressability 
were satisfied on a theory that EPA’s failure to regulate contributed to the plaintiffs’ 
injuries.169 Such a contribution theory could be extended to both lack of political action 
and consumer action based on industry-sponsored doubt. While there are key distinctions 
between climate change and tobacco fraud cases, these distinctions should not create an 
insurmountable obstacle to adjudication on the merits because the reasoning of 
Massachusetts could be extended to address both the issue of particularity and the issue 
of causation.  
C. Scientific Questions vs. Political Questions 
Political question doctrine also remains an issue in a climate change context, where 
it never was in the context of tobacco fraud litigation. When it comes to climate change, 
courts often conflate the scientific question of whether or not an injury is attributable to 
the defendant’s actions with the political question of how to regulate greenhouse gases. 
As discussed above, in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, the court found that the 
case raised nonjusticiable political questions under two Baker factors.170 First, the court 
found a lack of judicially manageable standards.171 The court’s argument is built entirely 
around the lack of judicially manageable standards for judging the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s interference for the public nuisance claim.172 The Kivalina court did not 
                                                
167 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (Am. Elec. Power Co. II), 582 F.3d 309, 338 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d 
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (“Their quasi-sovereign interests involving 
their concern for the ‘health and well-being—both physical and economic-of [their] residents in 
general,’ . . . are classic examples of a state’s quasi-sovereign interest. The States have alleged that the 
injuries resulting from carbon dioxide emissions will affect virtually their entire populations.”) (quoting 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982)). 
168 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009) reh'g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th 
Cir. 2010), on reh'g en banc, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (identifying as plantiffs “residents and owners 
of lands and property along the Mississippi Gulf coast.”). 
169 549 U.S. at 523 (“EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between manmade 
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. At a minimum, therefore, EPA's refusal to regulate such 
emissions ‘contributes’ to Massachusetts’[s] injuries.”).  
170 Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
171 Id. at 874.  
172 Id.  
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address the judicial manageability of addressing the plaintiff’s fraud claims. However, it 
is difficult to imagine that climate change fraud would be any more or less manageable 
than any other alleged scientific misrepresentation. Just like with tobacco fraud, a court 
confronting questions of fraud would look at the quality of the information on which the 
claims were based and determine whether the defendants could reasonably make the 
claims they did based on the information they had.  
Second, the Kivalina court found that a judgment would require a threshold policy 
determination that would be of a legislative nature.173 Plaintiffs tried to argue that this 
was not the case because they were not seeking injunctive relief, which would require the 
court to limit greenhouse gas emissions.174 The threshold policy determination the court 
identified was “who should bear the cost of global warming.”175 This is all well and good, 
but like the argument over second Baker factor, it does not apply to the climate fraud 
issue. Regardless of who should bear the cost of global warming, it is unlawful to 
knowingly misrepresent information in such a way that it causes injury.  
What is telling about the court’s analysis in Kivalina is the way basic scientific 
questions underlie the determinations that the court portrays as political. For example, in 
distinguishing climate change-related nuisance claims from the air and water pollution 
case law plaintiffs cited in defense of judicially manageable standards, the court places a 
lot of emphasis on the complexity of the causal chain between defendant’s actions and 
plaintiff’s injury.176 But this distinction is fundamentally a question of the scientific 
validity of the causal chain, not a question of political policy. To the extent that scientific 
questions were not problematic for tobacco litigants, neither should the science of climate 
change intimidate the courts out of confronting these important factual and legal 
questions. Especially since the science of climate change, though complex, is just as, if 
not more accepted than the science that linked tobacco use to cancer.177  
IV. WHY LITIGATE? 
The advantage to dealing with the issues of scientific fraud in the courtroom, versus 
in the political branches, is that courts isolate questions of fact from questions of law or 
opinion, and they have procedural rules, which separate truth from political rhetoric. The 
                                                
173 Id. at 876. 
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 876–77.  
176 Id. at 876.  
In contrast, the harm from global warming involves a series of events disconnected from the 
discharge itself. In a global warming scenario, emitted greenhouse gases combine with other gases 
in the atmosphere which in turn results in the planet retaining heat, which in turn causes the ice 
caps to melt and the oceans to rise, which in turn causes the Arctic sea ice to melt, which in turn 
allegedly renders Kivalina vulnerable to erosion and deterioration resulting from winter storms. 
Id. 
177 “I think we understand the mechanisms of CO2 and climate better than we do of what causes lung 
cancer. . . . In fact, it is fair to say that global warming may be the most carefully and fully studied 
scientific topic in human history.” Ralph Cicerone, president of the National Academy of Sciences, before 
the U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Questions Surrounding the ‘Hockey Stick’ 
Temperature Studies: Implications for Climate Change Assessments Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations, July 27, 2006, available at http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/193612-1 
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modern federal rule was established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.178 In 
Daubert, children and parents of children suffering from birth defects sued manufacturers 
of Bendectin, a drug prescribed to pregnant women to treat morning sickness.179 The 
Supreme Court found that the general scientific acceptance test in Frye v. United States180 
was superseded by Fed. R. Evid. 702, which at the time stated: “If scientific, technical, or 
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”181 
Daubert essentially established the trial judge as the “gate keeper of the science”182 by 
developing a “flexible” test weighing several relevant factors.183 Subsequent caselaw 
built upon this gatekeeper function to include independence as a consideration in the 
evaluation of the scientific validity of the evidence, something particularly relevant to the 
fraud accusations leveled at the hydrocarbon industry. 184 
Because Daubert designates the judge as the gatekeeper, the evidence stage of 
litigation is often fiercely contested and outcome determinative. A good example of this 
can be found in Minnesota v. Tobacco Industry, a lawsuit against six major tobacco 
companies and two trade organizations initiated in 1994 in Minnesota state court by the 
state of Minnesota and Minnesota Blue Cross/Blue Shield.185 The allegations included 
conspiracy, fraud, misrepresentation, anticompetitive behavior, and unjust enrichment.186  
Among the claims, plaintiffs maintained that, by virtue of specific representations 
made to the public in Minnesota newspapers in 1954, professing a belief that their 
                                                
178 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) 
179 Id. 
180 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (demanding evidence be “sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field which it belongs”). 
181 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588. 
182 MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 162. This gate-keeping function has a huge impact on the outcome of trials.  
If the judge excludes the evidence, there is usually nothing left to the plaintiff’s case, and the 
judge issues a summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Alternatively, if the judge rules that 
the plaintiff’s experts may testify, the case often settles, with both sides preferring that outcome to 
the high costs and the all-or-nothing stakes of a jury trial.  
Id. Understandably, there is concern that this places too much fact-finding power in the hands of the judge.  
183 These factors include: “whether it can be (and has been) tested,” “whether the theory or technique has 
been subjected to peer review and publication,” “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court 
ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. Under Daubert, 
acceptance and establishment would still be considered, but weighted with other measures of validity. Id. 
The rule was subsequently amended to incorporate Daubert factors, requiring “(1) the testimony is based 
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the 
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” FED. R. EVID. 702.  
184 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995) (“One very 
significant fact to be considered is whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing 
naturally and directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they 
have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.”). Daubert II presents an added 
challenge to any party seeking to enter expert testimony that is not based on independent research. If the 
proffered expert testimony is not based on independent research, the party proffering it must come forward 
with other objective, verifiable evidence that the testimony is based on “scientifically valid principles.” Id. 
at 1311, 1317–18. 
185 Zeger et al., supra note 11, at 305.  
186 Id. at 305.  
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY [2012 
 534 
tobacco products were not harmful to human health and promising to “safeguard the 
public health,” the defendants created a “special duty.”187 They also alleged that tobacco 
companies conspired to prevent the development of a safer cigarette and disseminated 
false information.188 The trial lasted ten weeks, and plaintiffs presented twenty witnesses 
to establish the harmful effects of tobacco use and industry misconduct.189 Defendants 
presented ten witnesses in its defense.190 The suit ultimately settled before the jury 
returned a verdict, with the state of Minnesota receiving $6.1 billion and Minnesota Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield receiving millions.191  
On the other hand, there is cause for concern over the propriety and effectiveness of 
placing a judge in this gate-keeping role. Commentators have observed that the shift from 
general scientific acceptance as a test to a more flexible balancing of factors takes the 
scientific judgment out of the hands of the scientific community and puts it into the hands 
of lay judges.192 There is also concern about inconsistency and confusion in the judicial 
application of Daubert.193 However, a study of removal rates among states applying 
Daubert and states applying Frye revealed no significant difference, which calls into 
question any strategic advantage gained by courts being more receptive to scientific 
evidence that is not generally accepted.194  
Adjudication also offers advantages over both resolution via the political branches 
and via the public forum. Unlike the public forum, courtrooms have rules of evidence; 
they have exhibits and cross-examination. In court, witnesses are under oath to tell the 
truth and experts have to disclose their credentials.195 These rigors and protections also 
recommend adjudication over legislation. In contrast to the extensive and uniform rules 
of evidence and procedure for federal judicial hearings, the rules for congressional 
hearings are set at the committee level and tend to be less formal.196 Witnesses are 
typically selected by a committee member and most committees make an effort to include 
witnesses selected by the minority parties for political balance.197 There are no 
gatekeepers to vet experts based on expertise. For example, comedian Stephen Colbert 
was called to give testimony in a congressional hearing on immigration,198 and science 
                                                
187 Id. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. at 306. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 MICHAELS, supra note 12, at 163–64. 
193 Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion, 29 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1085 (2006).  
194 Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility 
Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471 (2005). 
195  The problem is this: in court, there are rules of evidence (you have to tell the truth) and a judge 
who has the expertise and is given the resources to make an intelligent decision about what is 
being presented. But there are no such rules in the public conversation. There are only tactics, 
strategies and spin.  
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 30. 
196 Betsy Palmer, Cong. Research Serv., Senate Committee Hearings: Arranging Witnesses (Sept. 25, 
2009). 
197 Id.  
198 Ashley Parker, The Whole Truthiness and Nothing But, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Sept. 24, 2010, 1:19 
PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/24/the-whole-truthiness-and-nothing-but/ 
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fiction writer Michael Crichton has been called to present testimony on climate change 
before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works.199 
Controlling climate change fraud via tort liability would also be more desirable for 
industry in the long term rather than addressing misleading claims via legislation. From a 
First Amendment perspective, liability would allow more flexibility to deal with only the 
most serious cases rather than trying to regulate scientific claims directly. Also, industry 
would still be protected from frivolous litigation, at least at the federal level by 
heightened pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9.200  
A complicating factor in adjudicating the “climate change debate” is how aligned 
and intertwined the anti-climate change commercial lobby has become with general 
conservative, antiregulatory politics.201 This cross-pollination of science and politics has 
been problematic both for the science of climate change and for the politics. On the one 
hand, this alliance muddies the First Amendment waters, as the pursuit of fraud claims 
against petroleum companies also implicates—and could chill—legitimate political 
speech. On the other hand, it would also be imprudent to allow special interests to 
“scientize” their politics with false science to confuse and manipulate the public. 202 
It should be noted that self-interested speech is not inherently improper. Professor 
Martin H. Redish warns of the dangers of conflating democratically healthy, self-
interested advocacy with fraud.203 Based on his experience with tobacco litigation, he 
observes that there is nothing inherently wrong with adversarial research, especially 
conducted in response to a potential liability.204 He points out the no-win situation 
                                                
199 Michael K. Janofsky, Michael Crichton, Novelist, Becomes Senate Witness, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, 
at E1.  
200 The requirement to plead claims requiring scienter with particularity places a higher burden on plaintiffs 
to bring meritorious claims.  
201 See, e.g., Memorandum from Frank Lutz, Consultant, to President George Walker Bush, The 
Environment: A Cleaner, Safer, Healthier America 137 (2002), available at 
http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/LuntzResearch_environment.pdf.  
Voters believe there is no consensus about global warming within the scientific community. 
Should the public come to believe that the scientific issues are settled, their views about global 
warming will change accordingly. Therefore you need to continue to make the lack of scientific 
certainty a primary issue in the debate, and defer to scientists and other experts in the field.  
Id. (emphasis in the original). 
202  The people who are blocking or delaying action on climate change are putting the whole human 
population at risk. If they are doing so out of some sincere, if wrong-headed, belief that climate 
change really isn’t a problem, then their actions might be forgivable. But if they are doing it 
because their eagerness to post short-term profits overwhelms their judgment on their interest in 
the public good, then they should be subject to the full dose of public wrath.  
HOGGAN, supra note 8, at 87. 
203 Of tobacco industry lawyers he observes, “[i]n their capacity as adversaries acting in anticipation of 
legal conflict, industry lawyers could appropriately choose to support only those research efforts that they 
reasonably believed might lead to scientific data or conclusions supporting their client’s position on the 
potentially outcome-determinative issue.” Martin H. Redish, The Adversarial System, Democratic Theory, 
and the Constitutional Role of Self-Interest, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 385 (2001). 
204  By conducting or supporting unlimited scientific research, the companies would effectively have 
been placing themselves in a no-win situation with the buying public. On the one hand, if the 
research appeared to establish the absence of a linkage, public skepticism of the results of any 
research supported directly by the industry would have rendered the evidence of little use in 
convincing the public of the product’s safety. On the other hand, if the results of the research 
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manufacturers face when they responsibly sense that there might be a problem with their 
product.205 Redish sees working through intermediaries as a means of getting around the 
problem, in the sense that any vindicating research would have greater credibility.206 
However, he does acknowledge that the appearance of independence could also be 
abused, observing “it is conceivable that an industry could simply fabricate or falsely 
alter the results of its own or independently conducted research . . . Such actions would 
amount to fraud by the perpetration of conscious falsehoods, already shown to fall 
outside the . . . proper scope of adversary theory.”207  
Thus, it is crucial that any inquiry into the legitimacy of the use of science to 
persuade the public against climate change regulation not become an inquisition against 
legitimate voices of dissent, even if the interests involved are not entirely independent.208 
From a policy perspective, it would be harmful to the public interest to punish 
commercially interested research with liability. Yet, a chilling effect could also be evaded 
by confronting the issue in federal court and applying clear standards of scientific validity 
to conflicting climate change claims in order to distinguish the legitimate self-interested 
science from fraudulent manipulations of research intended to mislead the public.  
Commentator Holly Doremus elaborates on how the intermingling of science and 
politics inevitably corrupts both. She notes “[t]he core of the problem is not the 
involvement of politics but its concealment behind a cloak of science.”209 Doremus points 
out that often science is used to undermine or delay political decisions that ultimately rest 
on policy and value judgments, not empirical data.210 In many ways, allowing a fraud 
action based on climate change denial would be a step towards determining if, and to 
what extent, politics are at work behind the climate change veil. It should be noted that 
climate change activists are not the only parties interested in unraveling this relationship. 
Following the leak of private e-mail communications between several prominent 
climatologists performing research in the field, the blogosphere was atwitter with climate 
                                                                                                                                            
tended to confirm the linkage, both as a legal and practical matter, the industry would have been 
saddled with those conclusions even if its leaders honestly doubted their scientific validity.  
Id. at 396. 
205 Id. at 399. 
206  What the industry did to extract itself from this no-win dilemma, at least on the surface, reflected a 
form of true legal brilliance. It developed what was originally known as the Tobacco Industry 
Research Council, later changed to the Council for Tobacco Research. The Council, though fully 
supported by the industry, included a board of eminent scientists under the supervision of a 
prestigious scientist-director who served as an employee of the industry.  
Id. at 399–400 (footnote omitted). 
207 Id. at 401. 
208  The important point to keep in mind, however, is that if the free and open inquiry contemplated by 
the First Amendment is to be meaningful, the mere fact that a private individual or entity 
maintains a view of the science different from government or the existing scientific community 
cannot, in and of itself, constitute proof of either knowledge, falsity, or recklessness.  
Id. at 403. 
209 Holly Doremus, Science Plays Defense: Natural Resource Management in the Bush Administration, 32 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 249, 253 (2005).  
210 “The vast majority of the disagreements are not over the data themselves. They are instead over what 
actions are justified by imperfect data.” Id. 
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skeptics calling for RICO inquiries into climate change research institutions.211 To the 
extent a party can put together a proper fraud case demonstrating that the public is being 
cynically manipulated one way or another about climate change with dubious science, the 
responsible parties should have to answer for it in court, lest Lysenkoism hijack our 
policy decisions on the issue.212  
CONCLUSION 
In considering whether climate change fraud is capable of being litigated or 
desirable to litigate, it is easy to get lost in the size and complexity of the issue of climate 
change itself. Up until Massachusetts v. EPA, courts were hesitant to entertain any claims 
of injury resulting from climate change for this reason. However, if one steps back and 
looks at the global atmosphere as any other body, and climate change as any other disease 
caused by an imbalance in the systems that regulate that body, the issues start to take 
focus. Whether the smoke is coming from a tail pipe or a Marlboro light, once the causal 
connection is established between the intentional misrepresentation, the pollutant, the 
disease, and a concrete and particularized injury, there exists a triable cause of action.  
                                                
211 Christopher C. Horner, Manipulating Climate Change: Warming to RICO?, BIG GOVERNMENT (Nov. 
21, 2009), http://biggovernment.com/chorner/2009/11/21/manipulating-climate-change-warming-to-rico/. 
212 “Lysenko was a Russian plant breeder, without scientific training, who believed that acquired traits 
could be inherited, rejecting the already well-established evidence that genes control inheritance. Promising 
great gains in desperately needed agricultural production, Lysenko managed to persuade the Soviet Union 
no only to adopt his views, but to actively suppress the teaching and study of conventional genetics for 
more than thirty years.” Doremus, supra note 209, at 251–52. 
